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Abstract. This article interprets Jakob von Uexküll’s understanding of different beings’ 
Innenwelt, Gegenwelt, and umwelt through Deleuzian insights of multiplicity, context, 
and particularity. This Deleuzian interpolation into Uexküll’s insights acknowledges 
the absence of a unitary ‘human’ view of nature, recognizing instead that plural 
viewpoints of cultures, subgroups and individuals understand and interpret natural 
signs variously not just because of ideology but because of physiology and contrastive 
fundamental ways of accessing the world. Recent formative research in comparative 
neurobiology suggests that universal anthropological claims of cross-cultural semiotic 
similarity are incorrect. 
Interpreting biosemiotics as the investigation of apprehending the Innenwelt of 
radically different others (species), such semiotic understandings themselves are not 
necessarily generalizable between different members of the same species in a group, 
same-species groups in different natural cultural contexts, or even (as with humans) 
the same animal at different points of time (based on new understandings, patterns, 
or events of meaning altering interpretations of self and events). Conjoining Deleuze’s 
insights of the complexity of multiplicity with Uexküll’s scientific-imaginative system 
of comprehending other creatures’ ways of understanding their world offers an 
increased self-reflexivity regarding the simultaneous levels of actual semiotic activity 
for biosemiotic inquiry. 
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In Darwin without Malthus, chronicling the non-individualistic reception of Darwin’s 
theory in Russia, Daniel Todes (1989: 33) recalls scientist P. A. Bibikov’s observation 
that evolutionary competition occurs along three distinct but concurrent faultlines: 
“struggle within a species, struggle with other species, and struggle with the physical 
conditions of life”. All living organisms spread without limit, according to Malthus; 
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but they must also reckon with inhibitory limits converging from these three sources. 
The pressures of conspecifics, other species, and environmental factors occur 
simultaneously but not separately, diffracting the particular influence of each into an 
enmeshed impression for the organism. To assign primacy or ultimate cause to any of 
the given interacting forces composing the pattern of struggle would be to miss the 
important contributions, as well as the cross-interference, of the other vectors. 
Analogously, I will suggest here that the functional cycle (Funktionskreis, sensu 
Uexküll) of each organism does not just emerge along a single communication 
channel (such as pheromonal or aural), but that it is the diffracted result of mul-
tiple coincident interpenetrating layers of semiosis. This biosemiotic question of 
re cognizing and accounting for the multiple colliding modes of semiosis – that, 
depending on how one looks at it – occur serially and integrally, has seldom been 
considered.1 Yet, at any given instant, the sum combination of signals humans and 
other organisms encounter, internally and externally, is multiple and these interact/
interfere with one another yielding a unique synthesis of cohesiveness constituting 
the organism’s lived experience. The interactivity of semiotic phenomena produce a 
sensorially overdetermined experience for the organism (i.e., more is going on than 
can be perceived, consciously or otherwise), and an underdetermined individuated 
sign accessible to reified analysis (i.e., analysis of any sign cannot possibly take 
into account the total influencing/interceding diffractions resulting from sign 
interactions, both in parallel and across channel levels). 
This article takes up Jakob von Uexküll’s functional cycle model of biosemiotic 
processes, and fractalizes it à la Deleuze and Guattari. As a preliminary investigation 
of the biosemiotic implications of complex systems theory and allied philosophies of 
complexity, it necessarily emphasizes the plurality of processes that willy-nilly join 
forces to create what we perceive to be the Weltbild: reality-as-it-shows-up-to-us as a 
collision of the Umgebung (unconstricted reality) with our perceptual-sensorial and 
categorical-judgmental primed frontiers. These processes contain both stochastic yet 
never merely random (reactive) as well as purposeful (intentional) elements. While 
my intent is to raise the question rather than offer a set solution describing how to 
make sense of the multiplicity of intersecting semiotic channels that together form 
the functional circle for each organism, these observations can perhaps inform future 
biosemiotic analyses.
  
1 Perhaps, this oversight is because of the diffi  culty of cataloguing and then extricating one 
communicative channel from another, which I do not suggest can be fi nally accomplished.
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Welt and the functional cycle
Biosemiotics resists the simplifications sometimes found in Anglo-American ana-
ly tic frames of nature that reduce the multiplicity of meaning-bearing semiotic 
forms to a specialized linguisticism (cf. Davidson 1984). Philosophies espousing 
logocentric models of communication eschew specialized (sub)cultural discourses 
and communicative modes. The effect, as Derrida (2008) indicates regarding his cat, 
is that, following anthropocentric models of regard, we incorrectly refer to animals 
(and other groupings) merely qua representatives of a species or members of a 
category, rather than addressing the interspecies other in its irreducible particularity 
and context. In treating the other like a token of a type instead of a semiotically-
capable being, we miss the relational aspect of the interactive event, as well as the 
opportunity to learn the nuances of meaning for the other more thoroughly. The 
task of biosemiotics involves reworking semiotics itself to cultivate sensitivity to the 
various unexpected semiotic channels at work.2 Biology already is attentive to these 
semiotic channels; and biosemiotics cannot only diagram how signs affect agents, 
and how and under what circumstances agents effect what signs, but also offer 
plausible models for how one might go about communicating with nonhuman others 
according to their particular ways of knowing the world. 
Jakob von Uexküll’s (1909; 1928) understanding of different beings’ Innenwelt 
(the physiological self-guidance system), Gegenwelt (the “counter-world” in the 
animal’s nervous system that mirrors external impressions), and Umwelt (the external 
world as it shows up to a given organism) gave biosemiotics a preliminary model for 
understanding how signs emerge through the assemblage of semiotic events forging 
the multiplicity, context, and particularity of each sign-milieu.3 One of Uexküll’s 
essential findings was that not just humans, but all animals – and extending his reali-
zation, all organisms – necessarily engage in categorization. Organisms take the 
infinite variations of stimuli and chunk them into schemata of characteristics that 
allow for appropriately responding to signs as if they were members of a category 
(tokens of a type), rather than purely as unique instances. Uexküll’s interest in worlds 
(Welten) – inner worlds, mirror worlds, and external worlds, as well as the more 
general but never perceptible Umgebung (surrounding, reality-as-it-is) – accords to 
realizing the individualized moment of experience as the convergence of the different 
perceived worlds. The interaction of various sign systems, internally and in conjunct 
outside the organism’s body, composes the resulting impression known as experience.
2 Th us, playing on their homophony, Derrida articulates the need to be self-refl exive about 
what we call animaux (animals) being really but animots (human words for the entities we 
name animals). 
3 On this point, Uexküll (1928: 100) writes: “It is not possible to write an animal’s biology 
unless one has fi rst studied its function circle from every side”.
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Uexküll (2010) named those signs perceived by the organism (the input) 
perception signs (Merkzeichen), and those signs which the organism emanates 
affecting the world (the output) action signs (Wirkzeichen). He even composed 
a schema, the functional cycle, to describe the relationship between receptive 
perception and responsive action. Yet Uexküll (1928) tends to paint perception signs 
to be a product of the orga nism responding to external stimulus (or set of stimuli) 
that have surpassed a given perceptual threshold, rather than positioning stimuli 
recognition as a type of fluid categorization. Though some organisms have a broader 
range of improvisation and spontaneity in modulating responses in reaction to 
shifting waves of internal and external semiotic movements, Uexküll for the most 
part concentrates on more rigid forms of perceptual funnelling and the predictability 
of the functional circle. 
While Uexküll (1909: 76) does refer to the inner world of the sea anemone as 
not a “unity, but at least a trinity,”4 due to the lack of a synthesis of its three separate 
non-coordinated nervous systems, this is the exception in his work rather than the 
rule. In his discussion of the various “tones” or states of a sea anemone for the crab 
interacting with it – its “protective tone” as it provides defence against squids, its 
“dwelling tone” when the crab regards it as potential shelter, and its “feeding tone” 
as the crab feeds on it – Uexküll (2010: 93) shows how the crab regards the anemone 
as a different armature of its environment according to the precise search or effect 
“image” motivating its interaction. Here, the anemone shows up differentially to the 
crab according to the mode or mood predominant for the crab at that time. This 
situational specificity marks outside subjects and objects in one’s umwelt as taking on 
valences or colourations according to the states of the acting organism.
In the musical terms Uexküll employs, the metaphor would be: to identify a 
tone on the outside, one has to be attuned to its resonance. And such tuning, like a 
string on a lute, goes in and out of pitch according to usage, weather, and other (not 
always controllable or predictable) conditions. That is, the threshold of perceiving 
and taking stimuli as particular instances of stimuli (having the stimuli surpass some 
minimal threshold) sways in tandem according to the current conditions of the sum 
of preceptors making up the threshold in the first place. The same stimuli will show 
up (be catalogued) differently for different organisms, and even the same organism 
at different points in time. All of this depends on the confluence of states which 
respond to the different signals received, within and out. 
While I do not wish to exaggerate the incompleteness of Uexküll’s diagnosis of 
the complexity of signs operating at intersecting levels of the functional circle (e.g., 
Uexküll 1928: 100–104), the interplay between interior and exterior stimuli or states 
seems to be elided in his model. As Kull (2002: 332) writes on the endosemiotic 
4 “Es ist die Innenwelt einer Aktinie keine Einheit, sondern mindestens eine Dreiheit”.
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functional circle: “Due to the complex inner structure of organism[s], consisting in 
a large number of cells and many tissues, all being in a communicative relationship, 
there can be perception–operation cycles that are entirely embedded in the body”. 
What this all amounts to, is that the functional circle (or cycle) occurs not just along 
a single dimension, entailing a definite parameter unintegrated into a larger system. 
Rather, simultaneous sign-cycles (Funktionskreise) operate in parallel, informing and 
interfering with the semiotic processes of each ‘cycle’.5
Endo- and exosemiosis
One of the basic distinctions biosemiotics makes is between endosemiosis (all 
semiotic interactions occurring within the organism) and exosemiosis (the totality of 
semiotic interactions that take place between the organism and its environment, the 
traditional domain of the functional cycle). While both of these types of interactions 
are prevalent as contrasting types of interactions for all organisms, each of them is 
always embedded in processes influenced by the other. Many, if not all endosemiotic 
interactions also have subtle or direct exosemiotic effects (Wirkmale). Likewise, 
a sign received by an organism (Merkmale) will necessarily have endosemiotic 
consequences. Even single-cell organisms undergo both endo- and exosemiosis 
(Hoffmeyer 2008). Of course, due to enzymatic activity, the distinction between 
endo- and exosemiosis itself is not as cut-and-dried as this distinction prima facie 
sounds (Kull 2009). The porous semiotic-enzymatic activity that travels between cell 
barriers, although chemical in content, is not merely an automatic chemical signal 
“since it has to be remembered” and has a history as an enzymatic process which 
evolves and can dissipate (Kull 2009: 19). Thus, while allowing us a greater amount of 
analytic specificity to describe and observe the desired (endo- or exo-) phenomena at 
hand, the longer we attend to the “feed-forward” lifecycle of the sign processes (Kull 
et al. 2011: 73), the more inextricably Möbius-configured they become.
For more complex organisms, like fungi, plants and animals that are formed of 
differentiated cell-types (i.e. hepatocytes, red blood cells, neurons), we encounter 
yet another form of complexity. The fact that individual cells work together with 
their causae finalis yoked to the larger organism (e.g., the dog or the human) further 
complexifies the semiotic picture (cf. Juarrero 1999), because while we cannot ignore 
the individual (endo- and exo-) semiotic processes of particular cells making up the 
5 Th ese multiple simultaneous levels exist to the extent that we can meaningfully, say, separate 
out the individual semiotic processes of an animal’s cells amongst each other as a form of micro 
endosemiosis that is distinct from the more macro endosemiotic processes of that animal, such 
as digestion and alertness in responding to nearby prey.
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larger organism (Uexküll et al. 1993), it would be equally erroneous to see (what I 
am calling) micro-endosemiosis as preeminent for the larger functional circle of the 
higher-level composed organism. Of course, in alignment with Heidegger’s remarks 
on hammers – that we only deliberately notice the hammer (or other equipment) as 
separate objects when they malfunction, thus requiring our extra (displacing) attention 
(Heidegger 1962[1927]) – most of the intervening semiotic channels or steps that 
compose the final experience for the organism lie behind a veil of complexity and 
indeterminacy to which the organism itself has no direct voluntary access. 
The promiscuity of signs
Signs are no more stable than the set of conjunctions that maintain them. Stjernfelt’s 
(2014: 296–297) distillation of Peirce’s dictum that signs evolve raises a fundamental 
question for semiotics: when is a sign different from its previous instantiation? What 
is the mark distinguishing its change? Does any sign exactly match a future or a 
previous sign? When does it function differently from a similar sign?
The question of what precisely is “a difference that makes a difference”, as Bateson 
(2000: 318) calls it, is explicated in Karen Barad’s elaboration of Donna Haraway’s 
notion of diffraction. Differences for Bateson are always immanent, ensconced in 
an environment that provides the soil for their appearance.6 The interpenetrating 
wills, acts, and events producing what we take to be the resultant reality, Haraway 
(1992: 318) presents as “diffraction, […] the processing of small but consequential 
differences. The processing of differences, semiotic action, is about ways of life”. 
Barad (2007: 36) specifies: “Diffraction is not merely about differences, and certainly 
not differences in any absolute sense, but about the entangled nature of differences 
that matter”. Bateson’s original formulation of differences as comingled events that 
produce changes in systems and behaviour presages Barad’s notion of diffracted 
differences which formulates her viewing ethical, ontological, and epistemological 
dimensions of concrete practices as inextricably linked. Synthesizing these dimen-
sions of events, one can relationally interpret the multiplicity-all-the-way-down thesis 
of emergent coherence of multiple enmeshed semiosic threads.
Relational theories of agency or cognition emphasize the embeddedness of semiosic 
events in physical situations created compositionally, rather than under stood as heroic 
individualist acts (cf. Plumwood 2002 and Wilson 2002, respectively). Even the event 
itself, the phenomenon that we name as a thing that is separate from other things in 
6 Or, as Stjernfelt (2014: 297) describes it: “Th e signs and minds of man, animals and other 
possible thinking beings must evolve in order to conform to the structure of thoughts. Such 
intrinsic structures of thoughts, however, are not conceived of in isolation from the world”. 
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the wave of space and time which is always already in the flux of becoming, cannot 
be analysed outside of the “background” or milieu from which it occurs. Deleuze 
and Guattari get to the gist of this illusion of total independence. On the one hand, 
everything arises from something; nothing is radically sui generis or autochthonous:
the event itself appears (or disappears) less as a singularity than as a separated 
aleatory point that is added to or subtracted from the site, within the transcenden-
ce of the void or the truth as void, without it being possible to decide on the 
adherence of the event to the situation in which it finds its site (the undecidable). 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 152, emphasis original)
The analytical operation of calling out an instance of flux as an individual event, 
phenomenon, or being is to mark distinctions without this analytical carving of 
nature at its joints necessarily turning into a reified stringent separation of agencies.7 
On the other hand, “Every creation is singular, and the concept as a specifically 
philosophical creation is always a singularity” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 7). That is, 
not only do we contend with the question of where nature’s joints actually are when 
we wish to extricate individuals from patterns, mélanges, or wholes (Varzi 2011), but 
we also contend with the fundamental incomparability of all phenomena. Aristotelian 
logics of identity (i.e., A=A) never completely hold – except ideationally. Material, 
non-abstract phenomena instead form identity approximations of A≈A’. Deleuze and 
Guattari maintain, however, that not only do material forms take this singular shape, 
but conceptual groupings do as well. That is, in reworking the Uexküllian notion of 
thresholds of perception, we must confess that declaring stable categorizations of 
phenomena into classes as an automatic or given process is indeed a simplification.8 
Real organisms, as intimated above, may react variably to the same objects at 
different points in time or at the same point in time dependent on other conditions 
mediating their classificatory capabilities.
In between the extremes of holism and isolationism, utter sameness and 
irreconcil able difference, the nuances of signs metamorphose static particles of 
essences into waves of becoming.
7 Th e quandary of whether nature has joints at all to be carved, whether there exist natural 
kinds, is perennial in philosophy (Varzi 2011; Hacking 2006; Dupré 1993), but ultimately would 
unconvincingly require access to some Platonic level of epistemic insight to solve. Th e question 
of natural kinds is one of the fundamental questions of science studies. I agree with Hacking’s 
(2006: 1) summary: “Some classifi cations are more natural than others, but there is no such thing 
as a natural kind”. [Hacking’s 2006 lecture Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight. Lecture 
at the Royal Institute of Philosophy (London, pp.1-35) is available at: http://www.ianhacking.com/
PDFs/NK%20-%20Hacking%20with%20footnotes.pdf (last access 3.03.2016).] 
8 While Uexküll at times appears to have been savvy to how categorization too grows and 
moves with moods and states, contemporary biosemioticians have oft en (over)stressed his 
formalization of animal categorization according to a more stable and thus less improvisational 
architecture.
 101
Beyond the ‘encoding’ metaphor
One of the virtues of the Peircean-Uexküllian semiotic model, as opposed to 
Saussure’s, is the attention paid to interpretation as always at play in the process of 
meaning-making and intelligibility. Like hermeneutics, which Gadamer accents, 
assumes misunderstanding as the prima facie starting point rather than correct 
understanding, biosemiotics understands the role of interpretation as central to 
accurately assessing meaning, rather than assuming a dyadic relationship between 
object and subject. 
The digital code metaphor of language that ascended with first- and second-wave 
cybernetics theory led to Chomsky’s notion of a universal grammar, and, regarding 
animals and to some extent humans, it constructed a mechanomorphism – viewing 
living beings in the visage of the ordering and functioning of machines. Fodor’s 
(1975: 109) linear model of communication, for example, relies on an digital code 
model, supposing that “we have communicated when you have told me what you 
have in mind and I have understood what you have told me”. Ferretti and Adornetti 
(2014: 30–32) call this the ‘code model of communication’, which, to generalize, 
supposes a mentalese converted into the medium of language translated back to 
mentalese in the other person (Pinker 2007). In this model of communication, one 
either receives or does not receive the signal, with understanding being a binary 
rather than a banded phenomenon. Cognitive pragmatics charges such literalist 
cybernetic models of communication as concentrating only on the semantic content 
rather than the context, the intention, or the meaning of communications (Ferretti, 
Adornetti 2014).
As Hoffmeyer (2011: 59) writes: “Digitality in the life sphere assures the sharing 
(objectifying) of functions (and, in the human case, ideas), and thereby also their 
conservation through time”. Digital signs are but a part of the larger semiotic 
story. The plural types of signs (digital and analogue) occur simultaneously at 
various levels of semiosis (DNA, cell, organism). While digital communication and 
analogue communication types can be applied to the same phenomena (from an 
external versus an internal or first-person view), digital codes pass on information 
but do away with the singularity of interpretation which gives rise to newness and 
evolution (Neuman 2011). The liveliness of signs in working on the interpretant for 
that interpretant to become a sign for another interpretant, hints at the reproductive 
rather than merely duplicatory power of signs. Biosemiotics does not merely deal 
with the copying or exact translation of codes, but brings the biological insight that 
the interpretive action in the forwarding of signs gives a trajectory to the evolution of 
signs indicative of life.
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Extraction and abstraction
Recognizing the decentred nature of agency is inherent in ascertaining the complex 
nature of reality. Reductionism’s great strides in applied science have come at great 
costs not only to respecting the life of beings, but also at the cost of knowledge of 
the nature of reality itself. In many ways, veridical truth has been sacrificed at the 
altar of productivity. Just as Deleuze and Guattari understand that each philosophical 
system speaks past rather than in conversation with other systems,9 the disciplinary 
boundaries of biology, chemistry, and physics that separate these fields from 
semiotics preclude acknowledging the lush flows of emergence coursing through 
the interstices. This almost fantastic notion of the decentralized self comes to the 
fore in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994: 183) claim that “the being of sensation is not 
the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of man’s nonhuman 
becomings, and of the ambiguous house that exchanges and adjusts them, makes 
them whirl around like winds”.10 This is echoed in Kull (2011: 116): “The principal 
feature of semiotic reality is the multitude or plurality of any object in it”. 
Object-oriented ontologies (stemming from Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network 
Theory) also aim to complicate the subject-object divide by imbuing nonhumans 
with agency. Bennett (2010: xvi) “emphasize[s], even overemphasize[s], the agentic 
contri butions of nonhuman forces (operating in nature, in the human body, and in 
human artefacts) in an attempt to counter the narcissistic human reflex of human 
language and thought”.11 But what can this story of co-agentic self-making and 
experiencing say for nonhuman ontologies? 
While Uexküll recognizes the interiority of nonhumans in a way that both joins 
imagination and science, he fails to attend to the specificity of each member of that 
species. He begins his analysis not of this bee, or that dog, but by generalizing the 
species’ possibilities, its sense organs, its way of being in the world qua species – a 
good place to begin, to be sure, but perhaps not the final destination. What Deleuze 
9 One could think of Niklas Luhmann’s (1995) idea of subsystems unable to communicate 
directly with one another because they are running separate programs. Such subsystems can 
only infl uence each other through resonant events in one subsystem that happen to touch on 
relevant codes of another subsystem.
10 One can also fi nd similar claims of shared agency, or the non-exclusive ownership of one’s 
unifi ed identity in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. 
11 Where object-oriented ontologies go wrong, however, is in their utter disregard for the 
diff erence between biota and abiota, or more importantly, what David Abram refers to as the 
distinction between the born and the built. Th eir lack of conversation with the natural sciences 
also unfortunately does not aff ord much of a possibility of an alliance between biosemiotics and 
the well-meaning but misdirected project of object-oriented ontology (misdirected, because of 
their metaphysical idealism – see Wolfendale 2014).
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and Guattari give us, as well as the late Derrida of The Animal that Therefore I Am, 
is the specificity of the (ontologically decentred) individual. With attention to the 
specificities of description pertinent to individuals we interact with, nuances and 
colourations of character, habit, attitude, and comportment emerge that otherwise 
might remain submerged in our treating the individual organism we are confronted 
with as merely a token of a type.
Yet, for their own part, Deleuze and Guattari (as well as Derrida), can be accused 
of superficiality or lack of scientific rigour (see Phillips 2003 for this general critique). 
Bringing the relationship Uexküll holds to science and imagination together with the 
multiplicity of particular situated beings-in-milieus/as-milieus Deleuze and Guattari 
assert, provides us with the tools for looking at biosemiotics from multiple planes of 
immanence, from multiple scales, from multiple imaginings of what-it-is-like-to-be, 
so that we can craft a more complex and elegant picture of what for that being is.
While they concur to the plurality of worlds, rather than presuming a unified 
or objective perspective, Deleuze and Guattari in contradistinction to Uexküll call 
milieus what in Uexküll’s terminology roughly calls Welten (Innenwelten, Umwelten, 
Gegenwelten), positing their notion of the territory as the shared space of worlds, or 
the terrain on which worlding occurs: 
A territory borrows from all the milieus; it bites into them, seizes them bodily 
(although it remains vulnerable to intrusions). It is built from aspects or portions 
of milieus. It itself has an exterior milieu, an interior milieu, an intermediary 
milieu, and an annexed milieu. It has the interior zone of a residence or shelter, 
the exterior zone of its domain, more or less retractable limits or membranes, 
intermediary or even neutralized zones, and energy reserves or annexes. (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1987: 314)
So, even though Deleuze and Guattari depict territories that could be confused 
and reified as a possible known or objectified perspective, they fiercely defend its 
highly contingent emergence. They also animate the territory, interpreting it itself as 
vulnerable and reciprocally penetrating/-ed through its porosity.
One of Uexküll’s incisive conclusions is that each being has a tendency to confuse 
its own perspective or umwelt – its spatial-temporal perceptual prehension of its 
immediately surrounding and biologically-sensorially constrained “world” – with its 
Umgebung, the hypothetical non-apprehensible reality-as-such. While all beings take 
their umwelt to be the Umgebung, humans uniquely have the opportunity to self-
reflect on this and realize the misattribution. It is unsurprising that Uexküll’s notion 
of an organism’s umwelt is bound up with its adaptive milieu. An organism’s own 
perceptual faculties and agentic abilities arise out of the need to get food, take care 
of basic processes such as reproduction, whatever socialization and ecological niche 
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adaptations are required, and attending to companions (Kumpanen, be they of the 
same or another species, such as bees and flowers). Companions form the quotidian 
interactions of an organism that it influences and must adjust to in order to get by in 
the world. It is companion organisms, I would argue, that serve as ballast for certain 
vectors of semiotic and physiological evolution. Environments (umwelten), which 
are always local and predicated on the vantage point, scale, and specificity of the 
organism experiencing that environment, serve as the “soap bubble” that organism 
experiences and composes as its (inter-)subjective known universe (Uexküll 2010). 
Uexküll’s methodology of carefully examining nonhuman animals, ranging from 
birds to sea urchins, gives us an epistemic “in” to understanding that aids in achieving 
a “subject-subject science” that “is not a minor piece of conceptual technofix, [but] 
rather […] involves a major cultural project with ramifications through many areas 
beyond science and epistemology” (Plumwood 2002: 50).12 Moving beyond the false 
dualisms of representationalism or solipsism is the very work of biosemiotics. 
But might it be too facile to relegate ourselves to seeing being as categorizable 
in simple taxa and phyla? Could it be that (non-)deliberate cooperation is 
something occurring not only from an organism’s membrane or skin-on-in, but 
also from the skin out, that is, between the organism and its environment? Might 
our understanding of self as human be more collectively decentred than previously 
thought? And if humans may be more dependent on our non-self others and 
environment than previously acknowledged,13 could this also mean in the same 
sweep, that the intrinsic multispeciality of all life, the view that each being derives 
its semiotic orientation (or sense of self) via the ecosystems of multispecies 
meaning in which it lives, is also plural in its assemblage? Like fractal mathematics, 
communication is taking place on multiple levels simultaneously, each dimension 
(micro-, endo-, exo-, etc.) influencing the others, each with its own threshold zones 
of receptors to register movements in other domains.14 
Charles Darwin (2009[1859]: 52) wrote in The Origin of Species: 
I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to 
a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially 
12 Plumwood (2002: 51) elaborates: “Th e idea that we humans are completely immersed in 
a self-enclosed sphere of our own we can call ‘culture’ while non-humans are part of a non-
ethical sphere of ‘nature’ is the leading assumption that corresponds to and structures these 
disciplinary exclusions”. 
13 See Plumwood 2002 on unacknowledged dependencies as a form of domination.
14 Again, here, as inappropriate as Luhmann’s social systemic model is for living systems, one 
could say that even those eff ects (Merkmale) that do not directly register for other semiotic 
channels, can still be aff ected sometimes through resonant events that inadvertently perturb or 
encourage the interpretation of objects at remote semiotic levels.
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differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating 
forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences, is 
also applied arbitrarily, and for mere convenience sake.
The “fluctuating forms” Darwin alludes to can just as well be applied to systems of 
meaning as they can to the variations in and among species.15 To speak of individuals 
and species is useful shorthand, but, ultimately, these designations are relative rather 
than absolute. So too, semioticians encounter similar abstractions and extractions 
for the sake of analysis, which are but one of a myriad ways of describing the 
phenomena.
An ensemblist conception of agency
Protagoras observed, “Man is the measure of all things”; but the statement loses 
its orienting force the moment we ask, which human, precisely, do we make the 
measure? Deposing the conceit of monolithic normative concepts of the person 
expand the importance of plurality as the concept becomes not just a lens to apply 
to nonhuman nature, but also how we understand ourselves. Each human being is 
an ecology of scores of trillions of cells, the vast majority (by number) nonhuman 
bacteria, yet we still posit the ‘I’ of a unified identity deriving from this necessary 
multiplicity. And as animals, possessing discrete bodies with organs, we surely do 
have plausible cause to postulate an individual demarcated self, more than, say, 
plants, or fungi, where the distinct organism of analysis – the basic unit of being – is 
far more tangled.
Nonetheless, the ability to ground our species-specific ontology in sameness 
has encountered resistance from surprising corners. The most recent research in 
biological anthropology bears out Darwin’s scepticism against reifying the category 
‘species.’ Henrich et al. (2010: 61) found that Western experimental subjects are 
‘outliers’ compared to the rest of the human race – i.e., not representational samples 
to make gross generalizations for attributing anthropological universals to the rest 
of the world’s human beings. Regarding ways of being in the world as far-reaching 
as “visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and 
inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related 
motivations, and the heritability of IQ” (Henrich et al. 2010: 61), the authors found 
that college undergraduate test-subjects from Western countries provided research 
results inapplicable to the vast majority of the human population, whether this was 
15 Renowned primatologist Volker Sommer (2011) has (controversially) proposed that should 
humans and chimps mate, they could conceivably produce fertile off spring.
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on a neurobiological level using fMRIs or in terms of psychological or sociological 
experiments. Generalizations from these populations to count for conclusions 
applicable to “humanity” simply do not hold up to scrutiny when applied to people 
tested elsewhere in the world, perhaps due to the fact that over 90% of such research 
stems from experiments only on WEIRD subjects (subjects from societies which are 
Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic). Even on a neurobiological 
level, non-WEIRD research subjects often did not conform to the neural pathway 
mappings previously assumed to be biologically universal, because research of 
American college student test-subject populations coalesced around certain 
regularities due to their common milieus. 
Philippe Descola (2013: 2) has critically appraised this assumption of sameness, 
describing how “physical anthropology inherited the goal of establishing unity beyond 
variations, while social anthropology contented itself, most of the time, with accounting 
for variations against the background of a taken for granted unity”. Ac cording to 
Darwin’s principle of “divergence of character” there should be no reason why humans 
have evolved to share a single form of rationality or any other particular psycho-
logical trait identical between individuals. People are different – deeply, funda mentally 
different, culturally, genetically, epigenetically, environmentally – in ways that could 
not be predicted before the airing of anthropology’s dirty laundry of gene ra li zation and 
universalization became so well documented it could no longer be ignored.
Comparing Asian and Western research subjects, Markus and Kitayama (1991: 
226; original emphasis) write: “it may not be unreasonable to suppose, as did 
numerous earlier anthropologists, that in some cultures, on certain occasions, the 
individual, in the sense of a set of significant inner attributes of the person, may 
cease to be the primary unit of consciousness. Instead, the sense of belongingness 
to a social relation may become so strong that it makes better sense to think of the 
relationship as the functional unit of conscious reflection”. The cult of individualism 
Westerners have often believed to be their ontological identity, may itself not be a 
universal. If this is so, it behoves us to acknowledge and investigate other forms of 
self-identity. And, perhaps, this uniqueness of plural forms of identity goes beyond 
humans, ebbing and flowing among different organisms, depending on state, phase, 
life stage, or awareness.
Conclusion
Such an analysis recasts biosemiotics not as a unitary discipline consisting of “the 
human” view of nature, but rather acknowledges the plural viewpoints of cultures 
and indeed subgroups and individuals within those disparate cultures’ understanding 
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of natural signs. The above moments of weakening the grip of certain concepts 
from having a monopoly on interpreting any given state of semiotic affairs brings 
awareness to the bright threads of singularity (otherness) and relationality (context) 
that run through semiotic operations. Realizing that our perspectives are multiple, 
and that the world shows up differently in our reading of it into our own (particular) 
signs and symbology, not only requires further work in deciphering what referents 
mean to particular peoples (with productive comparative research sensitive to 
differences), but it also permits us to loosen our grip on assigning temporally and 
cross-culturally fixed notions of meaning, permitting micro-histories and regionality 
to play a crucial role in biosemiotic analysis.
While many previous authors have been attentive to the fine-grained distinctions 
of various types of semiosis (e.g. Hoffmeyer 2008; Kull 2011), few have taken up 
the messy complexity of actual interacting semiotic systems always already at work 
within each semiotic event and experienced by each organism (for one example, see 
Bruni 2011). While taking multiplicity seriously may complicate the straightforward 
tales we tell ourselves regarding the causality of signs and their effects, it can surely 
bring us closer to the semiotic phenomena themselves.
This article has been an exercise in remembering the complexity composing signs, 
with the hopes that future biosemiotic analyses can attempt to take into consideration 
the interactions of these various layers of intersecting functional circles. Nietzsche’s 
(2011[1886]: §9) wisdom that “[a]s soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself, 
it always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise”, affirms Deleuze 
and Guattari’s scepticism of overly rigid conceptual systems as paying insufficient 
attention to the limits of human knowledge. It could very well be that the interceding 
factors of causation which remain asymptotically opaque to us contribute far more 
leverage than we give credence to. 
I have identified points at which the multiplicity of semiotic forms impugn facile 
or linear readings of the functional circle. While Uexküll himself was quite sensitive 
to the ways in which the functional circles of different animals intersect and impact 
one another, to extend this between kingdoms, that is, to give a fair treatment in 
which the functional circles of the various animal, plant, fungi, and bacteria species 
all intersect and influence one another (while also attending to their respective 
forms of endosemiosis) would be a monumental (and in practice, impossible) task 
of theoretical biology. While we can never hope to create such a Borgesian map 
coextensive with the territory, it is worth keeping in mind these types of interactions 
as possible differences that make a difference, especially when we become convinced 
of a particular chain of semiotic conclusions. 
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Множественность и Welt
В статье анализируется подход Якоба фон Юкскюля к Innenwelt, Gegenwelt и умвельту 
разных существ, используя для этого точку зрения Жиля Делеза на множественность, 
контекст и партикулярность. Соединение подходов Делеза и Юкскюля приводит к 
заключению, что отсутствует всеобщий «человеческий» взгляд на природу. Однако 
можно сказать, что с разных точек зрения (суб)культур и индивидов знаки природы 
понимаются и интерпретируются по-разному не только по идеологическим причинам, 
но и из-за различий в физиологии и фундаментальных возможностях доступа к миру. 
Недавние исследования по сравнительной нейробиологии показали, что универ-
сальные антропологические утверждения о надкультурных семиотических подобиях 
неверны.
Интерпретируя биосемиотику как изучение Innenwelt самых различных видов, 
эти семиотические понимания необязательно распространяются на всех членов од-
ного вида, на группы одного вида в разных природно-культурных контекстах или 
даже (как в случае с человеком) на одно и то же животное в разное время (исходя из 
новых интерпетаций, паттернов или значимых событий, которые меняют понимание 
self). Связывание делезовского понимания комплексности множественности с пред-
лагаемой Юкскюлем системой понимания других существ позволяет включить в 
биосемиотическое исследование больше саморефлексии, учитывая одновременное 
присутствие разных уровней семиотической активности.
Paljusus ja Welt
Artiklis analüüsitakse Jakob von Uexkülli käsitlust erinevate olendite Innenwelt’ist, Ge-
gen welt’ist ja omailmast, kasutades deleuze’ilikke sissevaateid paljususe, konteksti ja parti-
kulaarsuse küsimustesse. Deleuze’ilike seisukohtade lisamine Uexkülli vaadetele tunnistab, 
et puudub ühtne “inimlik” vaade loodusele, ja selle asemel tõdetakse, et kultuuride, sub-
kultuuride ja üksikisikute mitmekesistest seisukohtadest mõistetakse ja tõlgendatakse looduse 
märke mitmeti ja seda mitte üksnes ideoloogilistel põhjustel, vaid ka füsioloogia ja erinevate 
fundamentaalsete maailmale ligipääsemise viiside tõttu. Hiljutised teedrajavad uurimused 
võrdleva neurobioloogia alal on näidanud, et universaalsed antropoloogilised väited kultuu-
rideülese semiootilise sarnasuse kohta on väärad.
Tõlgendades biosemiootikat kui täiesti erinevate Teiste (liikide) Innenwelt’i mõistmise 
uurimist, pole need semiootilised arusaamad tingimata üldistatavad rühma moodustava 
sama liigi eri liikmetele, samaliigilistele gruppidele erinevates looduslikes-kultuurilistes 
konteks tides, või isegi (nagu inimese puhul) samale loomale eri aegadel (lähtuvalt uutest 
arusaamadest, mustritest või tähenduslikest sündmustest, mis muudavad Ise ja sündmuste 
tõlgendusi). Deleuze’i paljususe komplekssuse käsitluse sidumine Uexkülli pakutud teiste 
olendite maailmatõlgenduse teaduslik-kujutlusliku mõistmissüsteemiga võimaldab bio-
semiootilises uurimistöös suuremat eneserefleksiivsust, pidades silmas tegeliku semiootilise 
aktiivsuse tasandite üheaegset kohalolu.
